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INDIANA LEGISLATION-1947
Where unitization is brought about by a voluntary pool-
ing of interests, there can be little doubt as to its validity,
with the possible exception of a violation of anti-trust laws.
The Indiana Act provides that agreements approved by the
Department of Conservation shall not be construed to violate
state anti-trust laws.82 At best, however, the success of any
plan of voluntary unitization is contingent upon the coopera-
tion of all owners. Some statutory compulsion is required.
Perhaps, as has been suggested by authority, compulsory
unitization of whole fields or of whole pools is the best solu-
tion. 3 [At any rate, Indiana has taken a long step in the
right direction; and the constitutionality of the Indiana Act
seems not seriously in doubt, in the light of the Patterson
and Marrs cases.]
PROCEDURE
Introduction-The 1947 General Assembly followed its prede-
cessors in enacting several statutes in the field of judicial
procedure.1 Inasmuch as the validity of legislative activity
in this field is still an open question in Indiana,2 and since
either judicial or legislative superiority in rule making may
be rationally defended and supported by authority,3 no opin-
ion is expressed herein on the validity of the 1947 legislation
in the field of procedure on the grounds that it invades the
judicial function. The question of legislative power has been
re-examined by the Indiana Supreme Court in two recent
decisions.4 It would seem that the present court has declared
in its last pronouncement upon the subject that many so-
32. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 277, §13-A(e).
33. See German, "Compulsory Unit Operation of Oil Pools," (1931),
17 A.B. A.J. 393.
1. For a collection of statutes passed since the rule-making act of
1937, see 1 Gavit, "Ind. Pleading & Practice" (1941-5) §§ 3, 4, 12, 13.
2. No case has been found in which a legislative rule adopted since
1937 and a rule by the court have presented the square issue of
legislative or judicial superiority in this field.
3. See 1 Gavit, op. cit. supra n. 1, § 2-14 and cases cited; 1 Sutherland,
"Statutory Construction" (3rd ed., 1943) § 226; Wigmore, "All
Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutional-
ly" (1928) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 276; Notes, 110 A.L.R. 22 (1937), 158
A.L.R. 705 (1945).
4. Kostas v. Johnson, 69 N.E. (2d) 592 (Ind. 1946), (1947) 22 Ind.
L.J. 284; Square D. Co. v. O'Neal, 72 N.E. (2d) 654 (Ind. 1947).
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called procedural enactments may be matters of substantive
law and not within the judicial rule making power."
Restrictions on Criminal Remedies. Chapter 189 places three
restrictions on remedies available to criminal defendants in
Indiana. First, a writ of habeas corpus arising out of a
criminal proceeding is made subject to the common law rules
of res judicata.8 At common law7 and in the federal courts"
today a defendant in a criminal case can file successive writs
of habeas corpus without regard to the rules of res judicata.
Second, the rules of res judicata are made applicable to the
writ of error coram nobis.9 Third, five years after convic-
tion in any criminal case a defendant is presumed to have
waived his right to institute any proceeding for writ of error
coram nobis.1o In two instances this period of limitation is
extended.," Any court assuming jurisdiction in violation of
this provision may be restrained by a writ of prohibition.
The third provision is of considerable importance. The
writ of error coram nobis does not lie where errors of law
are alleged. 2 "Its use is limited to those cases where a judg-
ment was procured by fraud or duress where the questions
could not effectively have been raised at the time nor within
the limits available under other procedures or because of
newly discovered evidence which was not discovered within
the time for an effective review under the other available
procedures."'' 3 Since Sanders v. State it has been generally
assumed that coram nobis would lie when the facts alleged
presented constitutional issues. There is considerable dicta
5. Square D. Co. v. O'Neal, supra n. 4, held rule requiring $50
deposit on transfer to Supreme Court was substantive.
6. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 189, §4.
7. State ex rel Shapiro v. Wall, 187 Minn. 246, 244 N.W. 811 (1932).
8. Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Salinger v. Loisel, 265
U.S. 224 (1924).
9. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 198, §2.
10. Id. §1.
11. Id. §5, (1) Where the defendant is prevented from instituting the
proceeding by: (a) the state; or (b) by an officer or employee
of the state where the defendant is confined; or (2) where the
defendant is insane.
12. Berry v. State, 202 Ind. 294, 173 N.E. 705 (1930).
13. Gavit, "Indiana Pleading and Practice" (1941) §472.
14. 85 Ind. 318 (1882). "In the case under consideration, the fraud
• . .is such a fraud as deprived the appellant of the constitutional
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury." Id. at 331.
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-in recent decisions's which support this assumption, and in at
least one case a petition for coram nobis was granted when
the defendant alleged he was not provided with adequate
counsel and was not advised of the nature of the charge
against him."'
In Woods v. Neirsthmeier,17 decided May 20, 1946, it
was urged that a similar Illinois statute deprived the petition-
er of his right to challenge a judgment rendered in violation
of his constitutional guaranties. The United States Supreme
Court refused to consider this argument until the statute had
been interpreted by the state courts, and thus, has not passed
upon the exact constitutional issue raised by the Indiana
statute, but as pointed out below, the Court has decided
analogous constitutional issues.
"This Constitution and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
Supreme Law of the land and the judges in every state shall-
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding."18 (Italics added).
In Testa v. Katt 9 this section of the Constitution was inter-
preted to impose an absolute duty upon state courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction to enforce federal statutes when those stat-
utes authorized suit in a state court. The opinion of the
Court was unanimous. In this case the Court reaffirmed
Mondou v. New York & -H.R.R.20 which held that state courts
could not refuse to enforce federal statutes even though this
duty imposed much burdensome litigation upon them.2'
The Mondou case has recently been accepted with mani-
fest approval by the Indiana Supreme Court.2 2  This court
also asserted that an Indiana statute, recognizes the Consti-
15. Fluty v. State, 71 N.E. (2d) 565, 568 (Ind. 1947); Kunkel v. La-
Porte Circuit Court, 209 Ind. 682, 685, 687, 200 N.E. 614, 615, 616
(1936).
16. Rhodes v. State, 199 Ind. 183, 156 N.E. 389 (1927).
17. 66 S. Ct. 996 (1946).
18. U.S. Const. Art VI, §2.
19. 67 S. Ct 810 (1947).
20. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
21. "We are not disposed to believe that the exercise of jurisdiction
by the state courts will be attended by an appreciable inconvenience
or confusion; but, be that as it may, it affords no reason for
declining a jurisdiction conferred by law." Id. at 58.
22. Bowles v. Heckman, 64 N.E. (2d) 660, (Ind. 1946).
23. 1 R.S. 1852, c. 61, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §1-101.
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tutional provision quoted above as the Supreme Law of the
State, binding on all state judges.24
Since the state courts cannot refuse to enforce these
federal statutes because they are the Supreme Law of the
land, a fortiori they cannot refuse to enforce the guaranties
of the Constitution, because it is also the Supreme Law of
the land. This last duty was stressed by the United States
Supreme Court when it said: "Nor can we lightly assume
that Nebraska affords no corrective process for one who is
imprisoned under a judgment rendered in violation of rights
protected by the federal Constitution. That Constitution is
the Supreme Law of the land, and 'upon the state courts
equally with the courts of the Union rests the obligation to
guard and enforce every right secured by that Constitu-
tion.' ,,25 The Indiana Supreme Court has also recognized
that the Constitution imposes a duty upon the states to pro-
vide some remedy whereby these guaranties may be en-
forced.26
In one situation, the application of this statute appears
unconstitutional. As pointed out above, coram nobis will
not lie unless other procedures are unavailable; e.g., the
time for an appeal or a motion for a new trial has expired
or the motion for new trial has been denied. It is also set-
tled that habeas corpus is not an effective remedy in Indiana
for a person who has been illegally convicted. 27  Thus, when
the five year statute of limitations has run, a defendant in
a criminal case, who might otherwise have used the writ
of error coram nobis has no remedy by which he may en-
force in the Indiana courts his Constitutional guaranties.
In this situation, this statute, literally interpreted, extin-
guishes not just a remedy, but the only remedy.
The Constitution of the United States is as binding upon
state legislatures as it is upon state courts. Therefore the
legislature cannot deprive the courts of the power to enforce
the Supreme Law of the land. A judge in a state court can-
24. Id. at 663.
25. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 352 (1941).
26. Kunkel v. LaPorte Circuit Court, 209 Ind., 682, 685, 200 N.E. 614,
615 (1936). Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294, U.S. 103, 113 (1935),
In both of these cases, the courts conceived this duty to be im-
posed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
27. Williams v. Dowd, 153 F.(2d) 328 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946); Potter v.
Dowd, 146 F.(2d) 244 (C.C.A. 7th, 1944); Note (1947) 22 Ind.
L.J. 189.
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not refuse to enforce the guaranties of the Constitution be-
cause of this statute.
There are four possible theories of construing this stat-
ute. First, in Ex Parte Hawk28 the United States Supreme
Court held that where a state remedy is inadequate or no
remedy is provided the accused may file a petition for habeas
corpus in an appropriate federal court. Thus, it might be
asserted that since a remedy is provided the Indiana enact-
ment is constitutional. Such reasoning is fatally defective.
It overlooks the basic premise that the state equally with the
federal government, has the duty to provide a remedy for
enforcing29 constitutional guaranties. The fact that the fed-
eral government is willing to assume this duty when the
state fails to perform it by no means excuses or justifies the
breach of duty by the state. Further, there is no indication
that Ex Parte Hawk justifies the federal courts in assum-
ing jurisdiction of such cases when there has been a whole-
sale shifting of burdensome litigation from the state to the
federal courts. The Mondou case rejected the argument that
a state court is excused from enforcing the Supreme Law
of the land because this duty is burdensome.
Second, it may be contended that a remedy remains after
the five year period because the Indiana enactment authorizes
the Indiana Supreme Court to extend the time for taking
an appeal from the original conviction. 30 This reasoning
would be fallacious. Whether or not the time for an appeal is
extended is entirely within the discretion of the Indiana Su-
preme Court. If, in a given case, this court refuses to extend
the time for an appeal once again the accused would be with-
out remedy. Further, this may be an ineffective remedy inas-
much as review on appeal is restricted to the record. At
most, this provision only creates another recourse to which
an accused must address himself and be denied before he
may attack the constitutionality of this statute.
Third, the statute may be construed as a waiver of a
constitutional right. The terms of the statute provide that
the waiver operates five years from the time of conviction.
This five year period may elapse and the accused still be un-
28. 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944).
29. Having a duty to enforce the guaranties of the Constitution, ergo,
a state must provide a means of enforcement.
30. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 189, §5.
1947]
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aware that he was illegally convicted. It is fundamental
that a constitutional right cannot be waived without knowl-
edge of the right.31 In order to construe the statute to be
a waiver from the time the knowledge is obtained, a court
would be presented with the manifest difficulty of delineat-
ing" the words "from the time of conviction."
Fourth, by the terms of the statute it is presumed to be
a waiver. There is no clear indication whether the presump-
tion is conclusive or rebuttable. If the presumption is rebut-
table by proof that the knowledge that the conviction was
illegal was not obtained until after the period ran, then the
accused would have a remedy; i.e., coram nobis. This is
the most plausible argument in favor of the constitutionality
-of the statute.
No other important changes were made in the field of
procedure,32 although several of the acts are worthy of brief
mention.
Costs-Chapter 255, provides additional fees for the collec-
tion of unpaid court costs. A clerk's charge of $1.50 and
a sheriff's charge of the same amount are added to the fee
bill. These charges become the personal property of the
clerk and sheriff respectively, and become a lien on the real
and personal property of the debtor. If the fee bill is not
paid on demand, these additional charges become a part of
the indebtedness of record. Upon subsequent voluntary pay-
ment by the debtor, the charges are credited to the clerk
originally issuing the fee bill and the sheriff making the
original demand for collection. The purported raison d'etre
of the Act is to provide "an incentive for collection of court
costs."33 It is submitted that the regular salary paid an of-
ficer is enough "incentive" to carry out those duties im-
posed upon him by law.34  Furthermore, since this amount
31. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1937); Miles v. State, 222 Ind. 312, 53 N.E. (2d) 779
(1944).
32. For a review of the recent Indiana cases on procedural aspects see
Gavit, "Procedure and Property" (1946) 21 Ind. L.J. 76.
33. Digest, Engrossed Senate Bill 226.
34. Ind. Acts 1895, c. 145, §129, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §49-1405;
Ind. Acts 1895, c. 145, §136, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §49-1412;
Ind. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), c. 38, §501, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
Repl. 1946) §2-3303; Ind. Acts 1913, c. 148, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) §49-1402.
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is credited to the original officers issuing and demanding
such amount, regardless of when paid by the debtor, the
collection incentive seems dubious.
Venue-The General Assembly has provided for a change of
venue from the county after a case has been reversed and
remanded to the trial court, notwithstanding any previous
changes of venue taken. 5 A change of venue from the judge
in such cases has existed.3 6
Another change of venue enactment 37 follows the pre-
vious statutes38 making the county from whence the change
was taken liable for the costs of the trial. However, the
new legislation does enumerate what shall be included in
such costs.39
Parties-In any case affecting the preservation or main-
tenance of lakes (meandering and unmeandering) and rivers
(navigable and non-navigable) the Department of Conser-
vation is a party in interest and-neither non-benefit nor non-
ownership may be pleaded as a bar to the Department's be-
coming a party plaintiff or defendant.40
Interest on Judgment--Chapter 105 resolves an apparent con-
flict4 ' by allowing 6% interest forty-five days after the ren-
dition of a judgment against the State of Indiana or its
agencies (except the Gross Income Tax Division). The Act,
however, does not apply to judgments brought in the "Court
of Claims" for which no appropriation has been previously
made. Presumably this is intended to refer to the United
States Court of Claims.
Contempt--Chapter 171 provides for citation orders in civil
and criminal contempt. Attachment of the body of the con-
temner is accomplished by directing a writ to the sheriff of
35. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 186, §§1-2.
36. Ind. Acts 1907, c. 59, §1, Ind. Stat. Alm. (Burns, Repl. 1946)§2-1404. For a general discussion of this problem see Crumpacker,
"The Change of Venue Problem" (1945) 20 Ind. L.J. 283.
37. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 176, §1.
38. Ind. Acts 1943, c. 1, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl, 1946) §2-1417;
Ind. Acts 1905, c. 169, §214, Ind. Stat. Anm. (Bums, Repl. 1942)§9-1312.
39. Cf. Board of Comm'rs. v. Moore, 121 Ind. 116 (1889); Board of
Conm'rs. v. Board of Comm'rs. 27 Ind. App. 378, (1901).
40. Ind. Act 1947, c. 76, §§1-6.
41. Compare -Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Indiana, 194 Ind.
657 (1924), with Indiana v. Scott Construction Co., 97 Ind. App.
652 (1933).
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any county, or the sheriff of the county in which the proceed-
ing arises may serve writ in any county in the state.4 2
Acknowledgments-Chapter 171 validates defective acknowl-
ments43 of notaries public, justices of the peace, and com-
missioned officers of the armed forces.
Notice to State-Another provision" was enacted pertaining
to the giving of notice to the Attorney General. The Attor-
ney General must be given notice of the trial date whenever
a claim is filed for or on behalf of the State of Indiana or
its agencies in any estate or guardianship cause which is
not allowed but is transferred to the trial docket.
45
Public Records-Photographic and photostatic copies of pub-
lic records may be made, and the originals destroyed. How-
ever, the time for filing legal proceedings on the originals
must have elapsed, and the Commission of Public Records.
must approve before the originals may be destroyed. If such
copies are certified as to authenticity and accuracy they
shall have the force and effect of law, and be received as
evidence. 6
Probate-A probate court having guardianship proceedings
pending may transfer such proceedings to another county if
it appears that the cause was commenced in the wrong coun-
ty, or the residence of the ward has changed or if it appears
that such transfer would serve the best interests of the ward
and the estate.4 7  Appointment of a guardian in the second
county is made a condition precedent to the transfer,'4 8 al-
though the Act does not enunciate which court shall appoint
the second guardian. The general rule in such a case is that
the appointment of the court acting first shall prevail.4 9
Chapter 150, section 1, permits judges of the probate
court to carry on most of their probate powers -during vaca-
42. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 52, §§1-3.
43. Ind. Acts 1941, c. 203, p. 620 validated defective acknowledgments
of notaries public and justices of peace up to that date.
44. The previous notice provisions, which are reenacted by the instant
Act, were Ind. Acts 1945, c. 3, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp.
1945) §49-1937.
45. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 196, §§1-3.
46. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 195, §1.
47. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 242, §1.
48. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 242, §2.
49. Ind. ReV. Stat. 1852, c. 12, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §8-101;
Soules v. Robinson, 158 Ind. 97 (1901); Anderson v. Bruner, 76 Ind.
App. 361 (1921).
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tion. The Act specifically permits the clerk to continue-0
to allow wills to probate and to grant letters of administra-
tion and letters testamentary during vacation.
Appeals from Corner Surveys-In 1852 a provision was en-
acted 5" whereby landowners could have the county surveyor
establish a corner between their adjoining lands. Such sur-
vey is prima facie correct, although provision was made for
an appeal within three years. The appeal period has been
changed and residents of the county, having personal notice
of the proceeding, must now perfect an appeal within ninety
days. Persons receiving notice by the publication must ap-
peal within one year.52.
Lis Pendens Record--In any action concerning land, com-
menced in any court in Indiana, including federal district
courts sitting in this state, notice must be given the clerk
of the circuit court where the land is situated.53  Previously
no provision was made for causes instituted in the federal
courts in such instances.5 4
Whenever a suit on a bond payable to the State of In-
diana is commenced in any court of this state, including fed-
eral district courts sitting in Indiana, notice of such suit
must be given to "the clerk of the circuit court."55  Quaere:
Which "clerk of the circuit court" would be the proper re.
cipient of notice of a suit commenced in the federal district
court?
PROPERTY
Mechanics' Liens-Chapter 23 of the Acts of 1947 provides
a procedure by which a property owner may secure the for-
mal release of a mechanics' lien which has been recorded
(upon his property) for more than two years. The owner
files a personal affidavit with the recorder of the county in
which the property is situated, stating that no suit has been
filed and no unsatisfied judgment rendered against the prop-
50. Ind. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), c. 45, §2, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1933) §6-102.
51. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 103, §8, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933)
§49-3313.
52. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 263, §1.
53. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 98, §1.
54. Ind. Acts 1889, c. 96, §1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1946) §2-814.
55. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 98, §1.
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